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█ Abstract Eliminative materialists argue that we can overcome the phenomenological gap between two 
different ways of referring to our subjective experiences – either as introspectively grasped in terms of 
folk psychology or as explained in neurological terms –  by abandoning the pre-scientific concepts of folk 
psychology. However, unless these theorists can offer a plausible explanation for why the scientific view 
of the human mind proposed  by cognitive neuroscience is so deeply counter-intuitive, this argument will 
remain unconvincing. In order to address the difficulties involved in making the paradigm shift from folk 
psychology to cognitive neuroscience I (a) briefly review the theoretical revolution that marked the tran-
sition from classical mechanics to the theory of relativity at the beginning of 20th century; (b) identify 
some similarities between this paradigm shift in physics and the birth of a new scientific view of the mind; 
(c) explain by means of (a) and (b) why neurological theories that reduce consciousness and the Self to 
aspects of brain dynamics appear implausible from a common sense perspective despite being sound from 
a scientific point of view. 
KEYWORDS: Time; Consciousness; Relativity Theory; Neuroscience; Eliminative Materialism. 
 
█ Riassunto Tempo e coscienza nel naturalismo cognitivo - I materialisti eliminativi sostengono che il diva-
rio fenomenologico tra due modi diversi di riferirsi alle esperienze soggettive, ora colte introspettivamen-
te nei termini della psicologia del senso comune e ora spiegate in termini neurologici, può essere superato 
abbandonando i concetti pre-scientifici della psicologia del senso comune. Tuttavia essi continueranno a 
essere poco convincenti fino a quando non riusciranno a formulare una spiegazione plausibile del perché 
l’immagine scientifica della mente umana offerta dalla neuroscienza cognitiva sia così profondamente 
contro-intuitiva. Per superare le difficoltà legate al cambiamento di paradigma dalla psicologia del senso 
comune alla neuroscienza cognitiva si presenta qui un argomento articolato in tre passaggi: (a) viene bre-
vemente esaminata la rivoluzione teorica che ha segnato il passaggio dalla meccanica classica alla teoria 
della relatività all’inizio del XX secolo; (b) vengono messe in luce alcune somiglianze tra, da un lato, il 
summenzionato cambiamento di paradigma in fisica e, dall’altro, la nascita odierna di una nuova visione 
scientifica della mente; (c) viene spiegato per mezzo di (a) e (b) il motivo per cui le teorie neurologiche 
che riducono la coscienza e l’io ad aspetti della dinamica del cervello appaiono implausibili al senso co-
mune, sebbene siano pienamente convincenti da un punto di vista scientifico. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Tempo; Coscienza; Teoria della Relatività; Neuroscienze; Materialismo Eliminativo. 
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█ The Hard Problem  
 
SINCE THE BIRTH OF THE cognitive sci-
ences fifty years ago, the boundary between 
the natural sciences on the one hand and 
philosophical reflections on the nature of 
human beings and their world on the other 
hand has become increasingly permeable.  
From antiquity until very recently ques-
tions like What is the mind? What is conscious-
ness? What is the Self? What is the relation of 
the mind to the body? Do human beings have 
free will? have been the exclusive preserve of 
philosophers and theologians. But nowadays, 
such questions are more and more frequently 
debated by experimental psychologists, com-
puter scientists and neuroscientists. 
However, although this “cognitive turn” is a 
new cultural trend of our age, the way in which 
this has been interpreted by philosophers of 
mind echoes to a large extent three solutions 
offered for the mind-body problem from an-
tiquity to the present day, that is, dualism, ma-
terialism, and functionalism. Criticisms made 
by followers of each of these proposed solu-
tions of the others also echo earlier rebuttals. 
For example, according to dualists, materialists 
incur a category mistake when they identify 
phenomenal consciousness with the brain ac-
tivity from which it emerges. 
Explaining how phenomenal consciousness 
emerges from brain activity is seen by many 
philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists 
as the Hard Problem par excellence.1 Many of 
them believe indeed that this problem is not 
only hard but also insoluble in principle. Ma-
terialists – and particularly the most uncom-
promising ones among them, often called 
“eliminativists” – argue on the contrary that 
the phenomenological gap between two dif-
ferent ways of referring to our subjective ex-
periences – as introspectively grasped in terms 
of folk psychology or as explained in neurolog-
ical terms – can be overcome by abandoning 
the pre-scientific concepts of folk psychology 
by means of which mental states have hitherto 
been described and replacing them with new 
concepts taken from cognitive neuroscience: a 
new discipline that nowadays, according to 
eliminativists, is causing a real paradigm shift 
in the science of mind and consequently in the 
view that we human beings have of ourselves.2 
However, despite the great progress made 
by cognitive neuroscience over the last twen-
ty years, the eliminativist argument will re-
main unconvincing until eliminativists are 
able to offer a plausible explanation for why 
the scientific view of human mind offered by 
cognitive neuroscience is so deeply counter-
intuitive and appears to most philosophers 
and scientists to be completely incomprehen-
sible. How to escape from this predicament? 
The solution I propose is the following one: 
 
a) I will briefly review an exemplary case of 
paradigm shift: more exactly the theoreti-
cal revolution that marked the transition 
from classical mechanics to the theory of 
relativity at the beginning of 20th century. 
b) I will try to identify some similarities be-
tween, on the one hand, this paradigm 
shift in physics and, on the other hand, 
the cultural process that for the last fifty 
years has been leading many philosophers 
and scientists all over the world to aban-
don a vision of human beings and their 
world still based on Descartes’ mind-body 
dualism for a new scientific conception of 
the mind as brain activity in interaction 
with the external world. 
c) I will try to explain through (a) and (b) 
why the (allegedly platonic) image of the 
soul as a “sailor” able to drive the body3 
appears to common sense introspectively 
more appropriate (and more useful in 
everyday life) than a neurological theory 
of consciousness and the Self that reduces 
them to aspects of brain dynamics, alt-
hough, on the other hand, from a scien-
tific point of view, the image of the Self as 
a self-conscious free entity ontologically 
independent of the body is not plausible. 
 
If this research strategy, here only broadly 
sketched, succeeds then we might hope to 
solve the Hard Problem or at least to learn to 
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live more peacefully with it. 
 
█ Time, space and gravity in the theory of 
relativity 
 
The earthquake that Einstein caused in 
the physics of his time had its epicentre in a 
deep change in the concept of time. This 
change brought about other changes in all 
fundamental concepts of physics as a ripple 
effect. Thanks to this theoretical revolution 
Einstein managed to solve the main problem 
that haunted physicists at the end of 19th cen-
tury: how can classical mechanics be recon-
ciled with the theory of electromagnetism?  
In order to clarify both this problem and 
Einstein’s solution in a very simple way that 
is understandable first of all to me (I am no 
physicist) let me introduce a science-fiction 
thought experiment.4 
A spaceship travels at the constant speed 
v=0.8c5 from Earth to a space station located 
at the extreme periphery of the solar system 
(at a distance from Earth that always remains 
the same) and as soon as the spaceship 
reaches the space station it comes back to 
Earth at the same speed.  
Two observers – O from the control tow-
er of the space port on Earth and O’ from 
within the spaceship – simultaneously launch 
a radio signal to the space station when the 
spaceship is taking off. O receives eight hours 
(8h) later the confirmation from the space 
station that her signal has reached its desti-
nation. Assuming that the signal travelled at 
the speed c=1 (that is, the speed of light and 
all electromagnetic waves in a vacuum if the 
space and time units of measurement are 
suitably chosen) both on the outward journey 
and on the return journey, O (a staunch sup-
porter of classical mechanics) calculates that 
the space station is at a distance of four light 
hours (8h:2=4lh) from Earth and that the 
spaceship, travelling at 0.8c, should have 
reached the space station five hours (5h) af-
ter its departure from Earth (4lh:0.8c=5h). 
Thus, by assuming that the spaceship 
maintains the same speed on its return jour-
ney (but in the opposite direction), O fore-
casts that the spaceship will be back on Earth 
ten hours (10h) after its departure. And in 
fact she can verify later that this is so accord-
ing to her clock. In addition, by assuming the 
existence of absolute time in accordance with 
classical mechanics, O calculates that also ac-
cording to the clock of O’, the signal that O’ 
sent at the time of the departure of her 
spaceship from Earth should have taken four 
hours to reach at speed c the space station 
and should have returned back to the space-
ship taking about twenty-seven minutes 
(0.4h) on its return journey.6 Therefore, O’  
should have picked up the return signal from 
the space station about four hours and twen-
ty-seven minutes after her departure from 
Earth (4h+0.4h= 4.4h ).   
Figure 1 summarizes the set of observa-
tions and predictions of O (according to clas-
sical mechanics). In this figure, K is the refer-
ence system of O (its x-axis represents the di-
rection in which the spaceship moves to 
reach the space station whereas its t-axis rep-
resents the flow of time for O). K* is the ref-
erence system of O’ as it appears in K (ac-
cording to classical mechanics) if you assume 
that O’ moves with respect to O by uniform 
rectilinear motion along the x-axis at the 
speed v=0.8c. Therefore, K* is by definition 
an inertial system with respect to K. 
In other words, if time is absolute as is 
stated by classical mechanics then t*, the 
time-axis of K*, must always remain parallel 
to t, the time-axis of O, regardless of the 
speed at which O’  moves with respect to O. 
As you can see in Figure 1, O’ drags t* behind 
herself, as it were, while she progressively 
goes away from O. And this happens in such 
a way that t* remains always parallel to t.  
It is only thanks to this parallelism of t* to t 
that in accordance with classical mechanics 
every possible event has a time coordinate 
identical in K and in K*. But in this way the 
signals emitted at the time of the space-ship’s 
departure from Earth no longer reach the 
space station with the same speed both for O 
and O’. 
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Figure 1      Figure 2 
 
Figure 1. K and K* are respectively the reference systems of the observers O and O’. The x-axis of K is coincident with the x*-axis of 
K* (the x*-axis, represented by an horizontal dotted line, is drawn above the x-axis only to distinguish them graphically). They 
represent the route followed by the spaceship during its travel from Earth to the space station (and return); x is a variable that 
measures the distance of any event (that is any point in the space-time plane identified by K and K*) from O (that is, from Earth) 
in K; x* measures the distance of any event from O’ (that is, from the spaceship) in K*. The t-axis of K and the t*-axis of K* repre-
sent the passage of time respectively for O and O’. O represents also the origin of K (that is, the intersection point of its axes), O’ 
represents also the origin of K*; t and t* are variables that measure, respectively in K and K*, the time elapsed between any event 
and the departure of the spaceship from Earth. The origins of K and K* are coincident in the moment in which the spaceship is 
taking off from Earth but the origin of K* slides along the x-axis insofar as the spaceship is getting away from Earth with velocity v. 
The event E1 is the arrival at the space station of the radio signals emitted by O and O’ in the moment in which the spaceship is 
taking off from Earth. E2 is the arrival of the spaceship to the space station.  E3 is for O the position (in the space-time) of the 
spaceship in the moment in which the radio signals reach the space station. The amplitude of the angle α in K and the amplitude 
of the angle β in K* are proportional to the velocity of radio signals (that is, of light)  respectively for O and O’. Therefore the “line 
of universe” along which radio signals travel from Earth to the space station is O-E1 for O in K and O’-E1 for O’ in K*. O-E2 is the 
“space-time trajectory” of the spaceship from Earth to the space station for O in K. 
 
Figure 2. K and K’ are respectively the reference systems of the observers O and O’. The axes of K’ (that substitutes K*) are 
represented by dotted lines. Like in Figure 1 x is a variable that measures the distance of any event from O in K, x’ 
measures the distance of any event from O’ in K’. Similarly the (ic)t-axis of K and the (ic)t’-axis of K’ represent the passage 
of time respectively for O and O’ whereas t and t* are variables that measure, respectively for O in K and for O’ in K’, the 
time elapsed between any event and the departure of the spaceship from Earth. E1 and E2 have the same meaning as in 
Figure 1(E3 has been neglected). However, unlike in Figure 1 the origins of K and K’ are always coincident and the velocity 
v with which O’ is getting away from O is represented in K by the amplitude of the angle θ with which the (ic)t’-axis is 
clockwise rotated with respect to the (ic)t-axis. Also the x’-axis is rotated with the same angle θ with respect to the x-axis 
but this time anticlockwise. The velocity of radio signals (that is, of light) is identical in K and K’. Therefore, the “line of 
universe” followed by the radio signals travelling from Earth to the space station is just the same in K and K’: O-E1 is coin-
cident with O’-E1. Also the “space-time trajectory” O-E2 (or O’-E2) of the spaceship from Earth to the space station is 
identical in K and K’ but in K’ it lies on the “line of universe” of O’, that is, on (ic)t’. 
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This is very clear in Figure 1: the speed of 
the signals from Earth to the space station is 
measured by the amplitude of the angle α in 
K and by the amplitude of the angle β in K*. 
The first angle is much larger than the se-
cond angle. Consequently, the speed of the 
signals is c=1 for O both on their outward 
journey and on their return journey whereas 
their speed is for O’  c-v=0.2c on the outward 
journey and c+v=1.8c on the return journey.  
The constancy of light speed, a central 
point of the theory of electromagnetism, is 
not compatible with the principle of classical 
mechanics that time is absolute, that is, it 
runs at the same pace in all possible reference 
systems (and therefore two events that are 
simultaneous for O are simultaneous for O’  
as well: see e.g. E1 and E3 in Figure 1). 
However, O’ (who is a supporter of the 
Special Theory of Relativity (STR) and de-
scribes by means of Figure 2 how the whole 
situation appears to her) substitutes K’ for K* 
as her own reference system. In K’  the out-
ward and return journey of the spaceship last 
only six hours (6h’) and not ten hours (10h) 
as in K. Moreover, O’  claims to have received 
the return signal from the space station about 
two hours and forty minutes (2.6 h’) after her 
departure from Earth and not four hours and 
twenty-seven minutes (4.4h) as calculated by 
O.7 How is this possible?  
The only way to explain the difference be-
tween the time measures8 taken respectively 
by O and O’  is to admit that one hour (1h’) of 
O’  corresponds to one hour and forty minutes 
(1.6h) of O: the time of O’  flows more slowly 
in comparison to the time of O. But this seems 
to be impossible!  
According to classical mechanics assum-
ing a slowing of time is absurd. Time is abso-
lute. The constancy of light speed main-
tained by the theory of electromagnetism and 
confirmed by many experiments seems to be 
incompatible with classical mechanics. How-
ever, Einstein proved that such an incompat-
ibility does not exist if the principle of the ab-
soluteness of time is abandoned. 
Figure 2 shows the solution recommended 
by STR to make classical mechanics compat-
ible with the theory of electromagnetism. 
The two theories become compatible if you 
give up the absoluteness of time. This rejec-
tion of the absoluteness of time is represent-
ed in Figure 2 by replacing K* with K’. By this 
substitution the space-time trajectories (that 
is, the “world lines”) of the signals emitted by 
O and O’ at the time of the departure of the 
spaceship from Earth become coincident (see 
the straight line on which the segment O-E1 
lies). But to make this coincidence geometri-
cally possible it is necessary to give up the 
parallelism between the t-axis (or better the 
(ic)t-axis) of K and the t’-axis (or better the 
(ic)t’-axis )of K’.9 
The displacement of O’ with respect to O 
is represented no longer by a shift that, with 
the passage of time, progressively moves the 
origin of K* at different points in K along its 
x-axis (see Figure 1) but by a rotation of (ic)t’ 
of an angle θ with respect to (ic)t (see Figure 
2). Consequently, since the constancy of light 
speed is represented in Figure 2 by the coin-
cidence of the space-time trajectories of the 
signals respectively launched by O and O’ 
(that is, by the “world line” of light on which 
the segment O-E1 lies) it is necessary that the 
straight line which represents this common 
trajectory not only be the bisector of the right 
angle formed by the x-axis with the (ic)t-axis 
in K but  also be the bisector of the  angle 
formed by the x’-axis with the (ic)t’-axis in 
K’. Only thanks to the coincidence of these 
two bisectors, every event which lies in O-E1 
has space and time coordinates (if the units 
of measurement are appropriately chosen) 
whose ratio is equal to 1 (that is, the light 
speed is c=1) in both reference systems.  
However, this is possible only if, by re-
nouncing the orthogonality of K’, after having 
clockwise rotated the (ic)t’-axis of an angle θ 
with respect to the (ic)t-axis, you also rotate 
the x’-axis of an identical angle θ with respect 
to the x-axis but this time anticlockwise. To 
sum up, representing the displacement of O’ 
with respect to O by a double rotation (and 
not by a shift) of K’ with respect to K is direct-
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ly imposed by the assumption that the speed 
of light is constant for all observers in accord-
ance with the theory of electromagnetism. 
The characteristics that differentiate K’ 
(in Figure 2) from K* (in Figure 1) finally al-
low us to explain why according to STR it is 
impossible that the units of measurement of 
time intervals and space distances remain 
unchanged shifting from K to K’. To find out 
how the units of measurement of spatial dis-
tances and time intervals vary in K’ with re-
spect to K, O’  can rely on the coordinates of 
two privileged events in Figure 2: E1 (that is, 
the simultaneous arrival of the signals at the 
space station) and E2 (that is, the arrival of 
the spaceship at the space station). Since ac-
cording to Figure 2 (that is, according to 
STR) both in K and K’ the speed of the sig-
nals is c=1 whereas E1 lies on the world line 
of these signals, in both reference systems E1 
has such coordinates that the difference be-
tween its space coordinate and its time coor-
dinate is zero.  
If the coordinates of E1 are (x1 t1) in K 
and (x1’ t1’) in K’ then the following formu-
las are valid: x1–t1=x1’–t1’=0 or according 
to a more general formulation10 (if you call s1 
the space-time distance that separates E1 
from O, that is, from the common origin of K 
and K’) the following formula is valid: 
 
a) (s1)2=(x1) 2– (t1) 2=(x1’) 2– (t1’) 2=0 
 
Moreover, O’ knows that in K E2 is an 
event identified by the coordinates x2=4 and 
t2=5. In K’ the space coordinate of the same 
event is instead x’=0. What is its time coor-
dinate in K’? It may seem obvious by apply-
ing the Pythagorean Theorem that11 
 
 b*) (s2) 2 = (x2) 2+(t2) 2= (x2’) 2+(t2’) 2 
 
Because of the opposite signs of the 
squares of time coordinates “– (t1)2” and 
“+(t2)2” respectively in (a) and (b*) these two 
formulas cannot be two different solutions of 
a more general single equation that deter-
mines the space-time distance O-E1 if the 
coordinates of E1 are (x t) in K and (x’ t’) in 
K’). Since (a) is a consequence of the con-
stancy of the speed of light whereas (b*) is in 
accordance with Euclidean geometry and 
classical mechanics finding a way to make 
the two formulas become compatible is 
equivalent to making the theory of electro-
magnetism compatible with classical me-
chanics.  
In STR this is possible by resorting to a 
mathematical trick devised by H. Minkow-
ski, that is, by expressing time coordinates by 
means of imaginary numbers whereas space 
coordinates continue to be expressed by 
means of real numbers. Thanks to this trick 
(b*) can be replaced (and generalised) by the 
following equation: 
 
b1) s2 = x2+(it) 2= (x’) 2+(it’) 2 
 
Thus, since – as is well known – the 
square of an imaginary number is a negative 
real number, from (b1) it is easy to obtain the 
following equation: 
 
b2) s2 = x2–t2 = (x’) 2–(t’) 2  
 
Unlike (b*), (b2) admits (a) as the special 
case in which s=0. Moreover, by reversing all 
signs except the sign of s2 (b2) can be trans-
formed into the following equation:12 
 
c) s2=t2– x2= (t’) 2– (x’) 2 
 
To understand why the travel of the 
spaceship lasted five hours (5h) in K and only 
three hours (3h’) in K’ is finally very easy by 
means of (c) since by substituting in (c) t, x 
and x’ with the empirical data t=5, x=4, and 
x’=0 you obtain (t’)=3: 
 
d) (t’ )= (52 – 42)1/2 = 3 
 
Moreover, if you generalize (c) to all pos-
sible events by a simple algebraic calculation 
omitted here for brevity you obtain Lorentz 
Transformations.13 And by these transfor-
mations you can calculate all other values of 
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Figure 2 (including how much slower time 
flows in K’ with respect to K ((1h’=5h/3)).14 
To sum up, unlike classical mechanics 
STR can explain why O and O’ take different 
measures of the same time intervals because 
it assumes that time flows for O’ in a “direc-
tion” that is inclined by an angle θ with re-
spect to the direction in which it flows for O. 
And the higher the speed with which O’ 
moves with respect to O (or vice versa), the 
bigger that inclination. But to say that time 
flows for O’ in a direction that is “inclined” 
with respect to the direction in which it flows 
for O is mysterious and incomprehensible to 
common sense. Time seems to flow only in 
one “direction” for all observers: from the 
past to the future through the present. 
However, to make it less difficult to un-
derstand this crucial point of STR you can 
reflect on the fact that thanks to the constan-
cy of the speed of light in all directions for all 
observers the distance covered by a ray of 
light in the time interval t is proportional to 
the space distance ct (space = speed x time) 
in all reference systems. Therefore, you can 
replace – as is done in STR – all the measures 
t (or it if you use imaginary numbers) of time 
intervals in all reference systems with the 
corresponding measures ct (or ict) of the 
space distances travelled by light in those 
time intervals.  
In other words, you can substitute the 
length of a time interval (in units of measure-
ment that will change from one reference sys-
tem to another) with the length of the dis-
tance travelled by light in that time interval. 
Of course, if the units of measurement of 
space distances and time intervals are chosen 
in all reference systems in such a way that c=1 
it is irrelevant to write ct instead of t from the 
point of view of the results of mere calcula-
tions.15 But from a conceptual point of view 
that substitution is instead very important.  
You can easily understand why it is so if 
you take into account that already in the first 
formulation of STR Einstein himself defined 
time by means of the procedure adopted to 
measure it.16 Therefore, if you measure and 
geometrically represent time intervals by 
means of the distances covered by light in 
those intervals you can, as it were, transfer 
the geometrical properties of the vectors that 
represent space distances to the vectors that 
represent time intervals. Consequently, the 
strangeness of a time that flows for O and O’ 
in different directions (and therefore flows at 
a different rate) disappears if time is con-
ceived as a fourth “space dimension” of a 4D-
hyperspace (called the “space-time of Min-
kowski” in STR).17
 
In other words, the core of Einstein’s theo-
retical revolution (if it is expressed through 
Minkowski’s geometrical representation) is 
that a vector representation of time intervals 
allows such a geometrical construction that 
the flowing of time for different observers in 
distinct directions (and therefore at a differ-
ent pace) ceases to be absurd and incompre-
hensible. 
Einstein himself developed Minkowski’s 
method to geometrically represent  the prop-
erties of space and time as he formulated the 
General Theory of Relativity (GTR) by ex-
tending STR from inertial reference systems 
to accelerated systems. The tensor calculus 
required by GTR is too complex to be de-
scribed here. Suffice it to say that GTR is a 
theory based on the so-called Equivalence 
Principle: the accelerated movements of a 
body in a reference system K become inertial 
movements in a reference system K’ if this is 
appropriately accelerated with respect to K.  
Consequently, a body that moves with ac-
celerated motion in K will move with inertial 
motion (or will stop) in K’ if K’ moves with 
accelerated motion with respect to K in an 
appropriate manner. For example, the ob-
jects inside the space station in orbit around 
Earth float (i.e. are stationary) for those who 
observe them from inside the station but 
they would appear to be in free fall toward 
Earth together with the whole space station 
for an observer on Earth who could observe 
them by telescope.  
Moreover, at this point we have to take 
into account the fact that because of the time 
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dilation and space contraction imposed by 
STR the four axes of a reference system K’ 
that  is accelerated with respect to K are rep-
resented in K no longer by straight lines but 
by Gaussian curves. Consequently, Lorentz 
Transformations (that are applicable only to 
inertial reference systems) are replaced in 
GTR by ten differential equations thanks to 
which the objective invariant physical prop-
erties of the gravitational field at a given 
point of space-time are expressed by the 
properties of its geometrical representation 
at that point (according to a geometry that is 
not Euclidean any more). The intensity of 
gravity at a certain point of space-time is not 
any more a force as in classical mechanics but 
rather a specific degree of space-time curva-
ture at that point.  
For example, in classical mechanics the 
motion of the Earth around the Sun is an ac-
celerated motion in a “flat” Euclidean space 
indifferent to what happens in it. The accel-
eration is brought about by the attraction 
that the mass of the Sun mysteriously18 ap-
plies to the Earth and vice versa. In GTR the 
motion of Earth around the Sun is instead an 
inertial motion along a geodesic, that is, 
along the shortest path between two points 
lying on a non Euclidean space-time that is 
curved by the presence of masses in it. 
To sum up, all fundamental concepts of 
classical mechanics – in particular time, space 
and gravity – are substituted in STR and GTR 
by other concepts that instead express physical 
properties by means of the geometrical proper-
ties of a vector representation of space and 
time, and are therefore able to reconcile classi-
cal mechanics and the theory of electromag-
netism but are very far from common sense.  
After the paradigm shift introduced by 
Einstein, on the one hand, the theoretical 
concepts of physics are no longer in accord-
ance with the spontaneous intuitions of 
common sense about the movements of mac-
roscopic bodies but, on the other hand, the 
concepts of STR and GTR allow you to see 
how much the conceptualization of the world 
offered by direct experience and common 
sense is naïve and deceptive. The change of 
paradigm Einstein introduced in physics  
teaches us that if the development of a sci-
ence gives rise to a conflict between the “sci-
entific image” and the “manifest image” of 
the world,19 it is the latter that must be labo-
riously and counter-intuitively adjusted to 
the former and not vice versa.  
 
█  Consciousness naturalized 
 
It might seem a stretch to draw a parallel 
between the paradigm shift that swept physics 
a century ago due to the formulation of the 
theory of relativity and the present cognitive 
turn in our approach to understanding our-
selves driven by research in the cognitive sci-
ences more generally and neuroscience in par-
ticular. However, there are at least some simi-
larities between the suspicion and disbelief with 
which STR and GTR were regarded by many 
scientists and philosophers a century ago20 and 
the objections raised against the possibility of 
naturalizing consciousness today. 
In other words, the resistance to the re-
duction of consciousness to its neural corre-
lates we see today is similar to the alleged 
impossibility of substituting Newton’s con-
cept of absolute time with Einstein’s concept 
of time pronounced a century ago by many 
philosophers and scientists. For example, H. 
Bergson the most distinguished French phi-
losopher at the beginning of 20th century 
even wrote a book against STR to support 
the difference, in his view unbridgeable, 
between the “spatialized” time of physics and 
“duration”, the interior psychological con-
tinous flowing of consciousness. According 
to Bergson, the former is a simple theoretical 
construct of science, that is, an instrument of 
calculation. The latter is instead something 
that you introspectively and with absolute 
certainty recognize as real.21 
If the comparison between these debates 
inspired by two paradigm shifts in different 
epochs appears too superficial to be taken 
seriously, it must be added that the theoreti-
cal and formal similarity between the two pa-
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radigm shifts is far more profound than a 
simple analogy between the resistance en-
countered by both conceptual revolutions. In 
order to highlight such a deep similarity it is 
necessary to accompany the brief recon-
struction of STR and GTR previously given 
with an  equally synthetic survey of the changes 
introduced by the cognitive sciences (especially 
neuroscience) in current philosophical con-
cepts of mind and consciousness. 
Of course, if you wish to naturalize the 
mind and consciousness you cannot unfortu-
nately rely on already fully developed theo-
ries like STR and GTR. However, you can 
freely use the countless studies on the nature 
of consciousness published by neuroscientists 
in the last twenty years22 to present some 
guidelines for a scientific and naturalistic 
reconstruction of the concepts of mind and 
consciousness. 
First of all, let me define what is the natu-
ralization of a mental phenomenon.23 Mental 
phenomena that are of type X under a certain 
introspective-phenomenological reconstruc-
tion in the language of folk psychology can 
be naturalized only if the following conditi-
ons are met:  
 
(1) Mental phenomena of type X must be 
“functionally reducible”24 to functional 
states of type Y (Y is a concept of cogniti-
ve psychology). 
(2) The functional states of type Y must be 
implemented by brain processes (or more 
generally by biological processes) of type 
Z (Z is a concept of biology).  
 
According to this definition of naturaliza-
tion procedures, all mental phenomena can 
be reduced to brain processes (and more 
generally to biological and physico-chemical 
processes) by combining a functional reduc-
tion with a neuro-biological implementation. 
Let us now apply this scheme to the naturali-
zation of the states of consciousness. The 
first step is to clarify what might be an ac-
ceptable introspective-phenomenological re-
construction of what is commonly meant by 
words such as “consciousness” or “aware-
ness”. Among the concepts offered by the 
most respected studies of today in the field of 
cognitive psychology and neurosciences a 
good candidate to fulfil this task is the con-
cept of Complex Scene proposed by Edel-
man25 in the wake of W. James.  
In this Jamesian perspective (in some re-
spects reminiscent of the thought of H. Berg-
son as well) consciousness is private and sub-
jective and is an ongoing flow of perceptions, 
emotions, feelings, desires, intentions and 
thoughts that is always continuous and re-
ferred to the same subject but at the same time 
always changing. Consciousness is selective 
and has distinct contents in distinct moments 
but at the same time it is always the bearer of a 
synoptic coherent view of reality.26  
That said, what is the concept best suited 
to fulfil the role of functional reconstruction 
of Edelman’s Complex Scene among the neu-
ro-biological and psychological concepts 
available today?  
Two concepts are strong contenders: the 
cognitive-psychological concept of Global 
Workspace Memory27 and the neurological 
concept of Dynamic Core.28 Although differ-
ent in many respects, both concepts converge 
in representing consciousness as the charac-
teristic of brain dynamics that allow the men-
tal states implemented by brain processes to 
exchange information with each other and 
hereby to issue motor responses reciprocally 
consistent and effective. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to hypo-
thesize that all the neural processes that at a 
certain moment “enter” (in functional terms) 
the Global Workspace (or, it is just the same, 
the Dynamic Core) of a person’s brain there-
by become able to exchange with each other 
the information that they are conveying and 
converge (in purely functional terms again) 
into the Complex Scene experienced by that 
person in that moment. But how can a brain 
process be admitted, as it were, to the Global 
Workspace (or to the Dynamic Core)?  
Although so far no one has given this 
question a definitive response it is plausible 
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to think that only brain processes which have 
assumed a certain “format” can enter the 
Global Workspace and that this format is lit-
erally phenomenal consciousness. In other 
words, according to this hypothesis phenom-
enal consciousness is neither an immaterial 
“thing” (that is, a soul) nor an alleged Central 
Processor Unity of the human brain function-
ally similar to the C.P.U. of a computer.29 
Phenomenal consciousness is rather the 
common “format” employed by all the pro-
cesses in the brain that make up the Complex 
Scene (or the Dynamic Core). And this format 
must be identified in turn with a property 
shared by their respective dynamics.  
In other words, in accordance with the 
first step of the naturalization procedure 
sketched above phenomenal consciousness 
must be redefined in functional terms as the 
higher order property of brain dynamics that 
transforms a sequence of detached and inde-
pendent brain processes into the continuous 
stream of an agent’s subjective experience. 
Moreover, brain dynamics can be represented 
as a trajectory in a vector  multidimensional 
space whereas its first order properties or high-
er order properties can be represented by first 
order derivatives or higher order derivatives.30 
Moreover, if in accordance with the se-
cond step of the naturalization procedure 
you search for a neural implementation of 
such a functional format, the synchronizati-
on of oscillating neural circuits is the most 
plausible candidate to carry out (at least in 
part) that role. This hypothesis was initially 
proposed as underpinning the neurological 
correlates of consciousness in the case of vi-
sual perception31 but is now highly credited 
as an explanation for the emergence of many 
other conscious states, for example various 
phenomena of “binding”, which explain e.g. 
how three distinct kinds of sensory inputs 
(relative to colors, shapes and movements) 
are fused into the usual conscious perception 
of an object that moves on a stationary back-
ground.32 According to this hypothesis, the 
emergence of consciousness is essentially due 
to the synchronization of brain processes. 
Regardless of the value of this hypothesis, 
what should be emphasized here is the fact 
that the basic difference between reduction-
istic and anti-reductionistic theories of con-
sciousness does not rely on neuroscientific 
technicalities but on the philosophical frame-
work on which such theories are based. Non-
reductionists think that no robot could in 
principle become conscious even if it were 
possible to equip its artificial brain with all the 
mechanisms of synchronization (or with any 
other property of brain dynamics) that reduc-
tionists might think responsible for the emer-
gence of consciousness in human beings.  An-
ti-reductionists think so because of a Carte-
sian conception of the mind according to 
which mind and body are metaphysically dif-
ferent “things”. Reductionists suggest vice ver-
sa that you must not remain prisoner of the 
image of yourself that you have inherited from 
philosophical dualism since such an image is 
falsified by the cognitive and neurological sci-
ences.  
When you have acquired a new scientific 
view of consciousness and you have reached 
the conviction that consciousness, whatever 
it may be, is anyway and first of all a neuro-
biological process among many others, you 
have already rejected dualism as a solution to 
the mind-body problem and therefore you 
have already changed the image that you 
have of yourself as a human being.33 After 
such a conceptual revolution in folk psychol-
ogy comparable to a paradigm shift in a sci-
entific theory, the identification of con-
sciousness with the synchronization of brain 
processes or with any other property of brain 
dynamics ceases to be implausible. 
 
█  Consciousness, time and gravity  
 
Is there something in common between 
the transformation of the concepts of time 
and gravity brought about by STR and GTR 
on the one hand and the “cognitive turn” that 
reduces consciousness to be the common 
format of the brain processes which enter the 
Global Workspace (or the Dynamic Core) on 
  Nannini 
 
468 
the other hand? Along with many indubitable 
differences there are also some interesting 
similarities between these two cultural revo-
lutions. 
First of all, the concept of “inclined time” 
proposed by STR on the one hand and the 
neuroscientific concept of consciousness I 
have previously spoken of as a certain proper-
ty of brain dynamics on the other hand are 
both theoretical concepts whose construction 
depends on a common methodological choice, 
that is, the use of vectors to represent the re-
spective objects: physical phenomena or psy-
cho-neurological phenomena.  
More in detail, in GTR – as previously 
explained – the force of gravity is absorbed, 
as it were, by the curvature of a non Euclide-
an vector space. However, if you want to give 
a simplified representation of the motion of a 
body in the framework of classical mechanics 
you can manage to do it provided that the 
body moves very slowly in comparison to the 
light speed. But you have to pay a price for 
this choice favouring classical mechanics: in 
your representation the curvature of space-
time disappears and consequently  gravita-
tion comes out again as an external force 
whose origin is mysterious. 
Now, let me come back to my hypothesis 
that the brain dynamics that implements the 
Global Workspace (or the Dynamic Core) can 
be meta-represented by means of vectors. If 
this is true, then  it is possible to venture the 
further hypothesis that the brain monitors 
itself and acquires a better control of its own 
activity by constructing a simplified internal 
model of  its own dynamics. Let me admit 
that this further hypothesis is also true. In this 
case, would it not be plausible to think that in 
the construction of a simplified model of its 
own activity the brain tends to isolate the neu-
ral correlates of phenomenal consciousness 
(that is, the synchronization of certain brain 
processes and perhaps other features of brain 
dynamics that are not known so far) from the 
rest of its own dynamics?  
In other words, would it not be plausible 
to think that a scientific vector meta-repre-
sentation of the model constructed by the 
brain of its own activity would show that in 
this model consciousness (especially with re-
gard to voluntary actions) is represented as 
an external force able to teleologically drive 
the brain activity by blocking automatic mo-
tor responses? And might it not be the case 
that this vector meta-representation of the 
way in which the brain represents conscious-
ness to itself reveals a certain formal similari-
ty with the way in which classical mechanics 
represents gravity?  
This hypothesis would explain why each 
human being spontaneously tends to identify 
himself with a conscious and free agent who 
is the master of one’s own body and not a 
part of it (or of its activity). 
In other words, as classical mechanics must 
represent gravity as a mysterious external 
force since it  ignores the curvature of space-
time in a similar way it might be that the brain 
in the representation that it gives of its own 
activity in the “format of consciousness” 
(which is its internal “machine code”) tends to 
represent its own dynamics as the activity of a 
conscious free agent, that is, a Self. As a matter 
of fact such a Self is only a virtual (and in part 
fictive) entity implemented by distributed 
properties of brain dynamics.34 What seems to 
be a free agent who drives the body is in fact a 
part of the body and its activity, that is, some-
thing embedded and embodied in the brain. 
Why does the brain deceive itself (that is, us) 
on this point?  
That is not easy to say. But the most likely 
hypothesis is that biological evolution has 
given human brains an internal “machine 
code” capable of simplifying brain activity. 
The brain often uses “computer tricks” such 
as the digitalization of the electrical signals 
that run along axons in order to minimize 
losses in the amount of information that is 
transferred from one brain area to another.35  
Might it not be that every human being 
has a spontaneous inclination to think (or 
better to feel) that he/she is the “sailor” of 
his/her own body, that is, he/she is a free and 
self-conscious agent although in fact this is 
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false?  Might it not be that this self-deception 
was installed by biological evolution in the 
brain of all human beings because it makes 
their sensori-motor coordination (and more 
generally their interaction with the external 
world) more successful although they are 
«nothing but a packet of neurons»36 or bet-
ter their being conscious and self-conscious is 
a “servo-mechanism” of their brain? But if 
their being conscious and self-conscious is a 
servo-mechanism, then it is a “rebel servo-
mechanism”!  
In other words, the biological mechanism 
of consciousness and the Self selected by 
Mother Nature to improve sensori-motor 
coordination changed its function step by 
step through a huge exaptation process. The 
result of this process is that the brain of every 
human being after his/her birth is progres-
sively “programmed” by the experience of 
social life, that is, by learning a language and 
a culture. Biological evolution selected in 
humans a brain that is able not only to per-
form very good sensori-motor coordination 
but also to live in society.37  
And so that servo-mechanism of your 
brain that in every moment creates in you the 
illusion of being a conscious and free agent if 
you are awake makes of you a person, too, 
insofar as it creates in you the further illusion 
of being a “subject” who on the one hand can 
maintain her/his personal identity over 
her/his whole life (despite the plurality and 
mutability of social roles that you have taken 
on) and on the other hand interacts with 
other human beings insofar as you recognize 
them, too, as persons with a conscious mind 
like your mind. Thus, each human being be-
comes in his/her eyes a “person-Self” who in 
fact is only a fiction produced by the dynam-
ics of his/her brain and a certain socio-
cultural context. However, this illusion is 
necessary for her/his mental health and to 
execute voluntary acts.  
 
█  Time, the sense of time and consciousness 
 
To sum up, it is a plausible hypothesis that 
you appear to yourself as a conscious mind 
distinct from your body only because this illu-
sion is a trick found by biological evolution to 
adapt certain animals to their environment. If 
it were possible to prove that this hypothesis is 
true, what else would be required to defini-
tively admit that consciousness and the Self 
are neuro-biological phenomena?  
In this case your consciousness and your 
Self would necessarily appear to you as some-
thing ontologically different from the activity 
of your brain, although this is a mere illusion, 
because this illusion is created by the brain 
itself and is biologically useful. 
Certainly, to prove that this hypothesis is 
true is a task that cannot be fulfilled by a phi-
losopher through any arguments a priori. 
Evidence is needed. However, such evidence 
is becoming available. For example the Ger-
man neurologist E. Pöppel has maintained 
that human beings perceive the flow of time 
by means of two mechanisms of brain syn-
chronization.38 The first mechanism creates a 
“window” of thirty milliseconds: all visual 
stimuli that fall within this window are per-
ceived as simultaneous. The second window, 
which lasts about two or three seconds, is 
constructed by putting together hundred of 
windows of the first kind: all the visual sti-
muli that fall into this second window are 
perceived in sequence but at the same time as 
a single “extended present” or “specious 
present”.39 In other words, the psychological 
present has a duration of about two or three 
seconds. Simultaneity and the  present are 
constructions of the brain. 
What matters here is that the two brain 
mechanisms by which we perceive time (si-
multaneity and the present) are synchroniza-
tion mechanisms of oscillating brain circuits 
identical to those that – as explained above – 
are responsible for the emergence of consci-
ousness. Therefore, the neurosciences con-
firm one of the key points of Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetics: the (pure) intuiti-
on of time is the form of the internal sense, 
that is, the common “format” of all mental 
states. More exactly, the perception of being 
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awake coincides with the internal sense that 
time goes by. 
Now, if you combine this conclusion 
which comes from neurobiology with STR 
you can finally explain why STR inevitably 
appears counter-intuitive to us human 
beings: the ratio between the speed of the 
bodies whose motion is directly observable 
and the speed of light is too small to produce 
time dilations and space contractions that 
can be detected to the naked eye. However, 
this response becomes misleading if it is not 
specified that the order of magnitude accord-
ing to which the ratio between the speed of 
bodies that are directly observable and the 
speed of light must be small. Smallness is a 
comparative concept.  
If we consider the problem from this 
point of view it is clear that the scale at which 
that relation appears small is a human scale. 
More precisely, it is the scale at which the 
human brain works to control sensori-motor 
coordination. The reason why the absolute 
time of classical mechanics seems intuitively 
acceptable whereas the dilatable time of STR 
is counter-intuitive must not be searched for 
in the structure of objective external reality 
but in the way in which the human brain per-
ceives this reality. 
And it is here that the theory of brain syn-
chronization I have previously referred to is 
very useful. According to this theory – as we 
have seen – all the visual stimuli that fall 
within a range of 30 ms. are perceived as 
simultaneous. Consequently, for the human 
brain (and therefore for all human beings in 
their everyday life) the speed of light is prac-
tically infinite within a radius of 9,000 km 
(the distance covered by light in 30 ms). But 
an infinite speed of light makes it so that the 
Lorentz Transformations coincide with Gali-
lei Transformations and that the space-time 
of Minkowski is transformed into a vector 
space in which time-axes of all reference sys-
tems are parallel to each other and the units 
of measurement of time and space are inde-
pendent of each other. In other words, it is 
the limited power of temporal resolution of 
the human brain that makes the absolute 
time of classical mechanics intuitively appear 
acceptable whereas the dilatable time of STR 
is counter-intuitive. 
More generally, psycho-neurological the-
ories of perception such as Pöppel’s theory 
suggest that phenomenal time is not identical 
to real time. Moreover, if – as we have seen – 
the perception of time coincides with the 
emergence of consciousness, then it is plausi-
ble to assume that the relation between phe-
nomenal time and real time is analogous to 
the relation between phenomenal conscious-
ness and its neural correlates. Consequently, 
if you can find out in the functioning of the 
brain an explanation for the difference be-
tween phenomenal time and real time, why 
should you not explain by certain properties 
of your brain’s dynamics why you feel like a 
free agent and a self-conscious master of 
your own body whereas you are in reality just 
a servo-mechanism of your brain? 
To sum up, the Hard Problem is neither a 
true scientific problem that has not been em-
pirically solved yet nor a mystery. It seems to 
be an insoluble mystery in principle only be-
cause it is in fact a philosophical pseudo-
problem which is not to be solved but rather 
dissolved through conceptual analysis. How-
ever, the conceptual analysis able to dissolve 
it (or at least to avoid having it rest in the 
centre of the image that we human beings 
have of ourselves) cannot be reduced to an 
analysis of common language in the manner 
of L. Wittgenstein. Such an analysis must 
nourish itself, as it were, with the new ideas 
coming from the cognitive sciences in general 
and from cognitive neuroscience in particu-
lar. Einstein’s theories constrained physicists 
to correct and in part abandon some funda-
mental concepts of classical mechanics. Why 
should a new science of the mind/brain not 
deeply change folk psychology? 
In other words, the effort that is usually 
required to accept STR and GTR because of 
their being strongly counter-intuitive is com-
parable to the effort that is required to over-
come the reluctance of many people in ac-
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cepting the fact that we human beings are 
just a “packet of neurons”. But the advantage 
that we get in both cases thanks to these ef-
forts is equally big. STR and GTR, particu-
larly if coupled with Pöppel’s neurological 
theories, are able to explain why such theo-
ries are counter-intuitive and less acceptable 
than classical mechanics for common sense 
although they are preferable to classical me-
chanics from a scientific point of view. In a 
similar way, a new science of the mind/brain 
allows us to now begin to clarify within the 
“scientific image of the man” – to borrow 
Sellars’ words40 – why the “manifest image” 
that we human beings have of ourselves usu-
ally favours Cartesian dualism but is funda-
mentally wrong. 
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